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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT LIVES!
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR JONAKAIT
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
The spring before last, as I was teaching Criminal Procedure II,
which covers defendants' trial rights, I thought that I noticed a trend
in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject. It was
couched in relativistic "due process" terms, rather than in the more
absolute language dictated by the Sixth Amendment's command
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . ."I I envi-
sioned an article analyzing this trend with the title, The Disincorpora-
tion of the Sixth Amendment, which I planned to begin writing late in
the summer of 1992.
Imagine my dismay, when in May 1992, there arrived on my
desk an article in this journal by Professor Randolph Jonakait, Fore-
word: Notes for a Consistent and Meaningful Sixth Amendment, 2 which
made essentially the same point I had planned to make. Like the
man in the Tom Lehrer song, "The Great Lobachevsky," Professor
Jonakait's "name in Bloomington was cursed, when I find out, he
publish first!"
I glanced through Professor Jonakait's well-written article and
saw that it made essentially the point I planned to make. I cursed
briefly and put the issue aside until later. Now I have returned to it,
and my opinion of ProfessorJonakait's position has changed. I have
concluded that Professor Jonakait's and my (initial) perception of a
return to the pre-incorporation due process standard was inaccu-
rate. The cases that Jonakait criticizes do not exemplify such a
trend. Where he suggests that the cases are wrongly decided, I con-
clude that they are either right or, at least, not wrong for the reasons
he suggests. Accordingly, I am grateful to Professor Jonakait for
* Professor of Law and Ira Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University (Blooming-
ton) School of Law. I would like to thank Professors David Williams, Joe Hoffman and
Yale Kamisar for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 82J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713 (1992).
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being the one who put what I now believe to be an erroneous im-
pression on paper, for it is much easier to think critically about
someone else's ideas than one's own.
Professor Jonakait's argument is as follows: The Sixth Amend-
ment reposes a series of affirmative rights in the criminal defendant.
These rights are by no means the same as the Due Process Clause
guarantee, which only requires that a trial be "fundamentally fair."' 3
To the extent that the Supreme Court has, in a series of recent
cases, 4 conflated these two rights, it has had the effect of dis-
incorporating the Sixth Amendment and returning to the pre-incor-
poration standard of "fundamental fairness." According to this
standard, a conviction would only be reversed if the "trial [was] of-
fensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right." 5
As Professor Jonakait points out, under the Sixth Amendment,
a defendant who is denied a jury trial would be entitled to have his
conviction reversed, even if he had a fair trial before a judge.6
Under a "due process" regime, by contrast, he might not be entitled
to a reversal. 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court, by incorporating the
jury trial right into the Fourteenth Amendment in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, recognized this: "A criminal process which was fair and equita-
ble but used no juries is easy to imagine."8 Nevertheless, the Court
held that such a trial would not pass muster under the Sixth Amend-
ment, and it has not retreated from that position. ProfessorJonakait
agrees that the Supreme Court has not altered its position as to the
jury trial right, but he argues that the Court has gone astray in other
3 E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1941).
4 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39 (1986); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
5 Jonakait, supra note 1, at 716 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 473).
6 Id. at 731.
7 This was not invariably true under the "due process" regime, however. For exam-
ple, in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the "Court constructed a rule that the
televising of a defendant in the act of confessing to a crime was inherently invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even without a showing of preju-
dice or a demonstration of the nexus between the televised confession and the trial."
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965) (discussing Rideau v. Louisiana). Similarly, fail-
ure to provide counsel in a capital case is automatically reversible error as a matter of
due process, without any assessment of the fairness of the trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
8 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968). In Duncan, the Court noted
that it had never explicitly approved a conviction in which a defendant had been de-
prived of a jury. The Court conceded, however, that in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937), and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), "important dicta as-
sert[ed] that the right to a jury trial [was] not essential to ordered liberty and may be
dispensed with by the States regardless of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.
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areas. He illustrates this trend by pointing to decisions concerning
impartial juries, effective assistance of counsel and compulsory
process. 9
Exhibit one, offered by Professor Jonakait to show that the cur-
rent Supreme Court has mislaid the principle of Duncan as to other
Sixth Amendment rights, is MuMin v. Virginia.'0 In Mu'Min, the
Court dealt with a murder defendant who had been subjected to
substantial adverse publicity before trial. Though the defendant
asked the trial court to question the jurors individually about the con-
tent of the publicity to which they had been exposed, the court de-
nied this request. Instead, the judge broke the venire into panels of
four and conducted further questioning only of those jurors who
indicated that they had read something about the case. The judge
limited his questions to whether a juror could put aside what he had
read, but the judge did not ask the jurors about the content of such
reading. As the Supreme Court noted:
None of the those jurors] eventually seated stated that he had formed
an opinion, or gave any indication that he was biased or prejudiced
against the defendant. All swore that they could enter the jury box
with an open mind and wait until the entire case was presented before
reaching a conclusion as to guilt or innocence."I
The Court then went on to make the statement that provides
the basis for Professor Jonakait's argument:
Questions about the content of the publicity to which jurors have been
exposed might be helpful in assessing whether ajuror is impartial. To
be constitutionally compelled, however, it is not enough that such
questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court'sfailure to ask these ques-
tions must render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.12
Taken out of context, this statement might be read to stand for
a different proposition: that if the trial is "fundamentally fair," then
it does not matter whether the jury is biased. This seems to be Pro-
fessor Jonakait's understanding of the Mu'Min decision. He then
concludes that the Court's employment of a fundamental fairness
approach "made the specific Sixth Amendment guarantee [of an im-
partial jury] superfluous."' 13 However, a consideration of the entire
9 See supra note 4.
10 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
11 Id. at 1903. In Irvin v. Dowd, however, "two thirds of the jurors actually seated had
formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1906 (citing
Irvin, 336 U.S. 717 (1961)).
12 Jonakait, supra note 1, at 715 (quoting Mu'Min, I11 S. Ct. at 1905 (emphasis
added)).
'3 Id.
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Mu'Min opinion makes it clear that Jonakait misinterprets the
quoted language.
Part of the reason for Professor Jonakait's misunderstanding
lies in the nature of the "impartial jury" guarantee. Whereas it is
entirely possible to have a "fundamentally fair" non-jury trial, as
ProfessorJonakait observed, it is hard to imagine a "fundamentally
fair" trial before a biased jury. 14 If, however, we assume that such a
result is possible, how would one establish it? The only scenario
that could remotely merit such a result is a trial in which the defend-
ant's guilt is so overwhelming that no juror, regardless of bias, could
find the defendant innocent.
But the majority opinion is devoid of any such analysis. Rather,
it is clear that the majority simply assumed that there is no such
thing as a fundamentally fair trial before a biased jury, and it de-
voted the opinion to establishing that the jury in this case was im-
partial (as the first paragraph quoted above shows), or at least that
there was no "manifest error" in the trial judge's finding of imparti-
ality' 5 [that is, that the procedures adopted by the trial court were
"fundamentally fair."].
If the Court had found either that the jury was not "impartial"
as the Sixth Amendment requires, or that the procedures adopted
by the trial judge were not "fundamentally fair," as the Due Process
Clause requires, then it is clear that the majority would have re-
versed the conviction. Indeed, the majority goes further by citing
Ham v. South Carolina 16 and Turner v. Murray 17 for the proposition
that, in certain cases involving black defendants and white victims, it
is reversible error for the trial court to deny inquiry into possible
racial prejudice on voir dire, regardless of any showing of
prejudice.'
The dissenters in MuMin disagreed with the majority as to the
14 Indeed, in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), where the bailiff expressed his
opinion to three jurors that the defendant was guilty, the conviction was reversed, de-
spite no showing of actual prejudice.
15 See MuMin, II1 S. Ct. at 1907-08. It appears that Jonakait is satisfied with this
standard, which places a heavy burden on the defendant if he is to prevail on appeal. At
other times, however, Jonakait seems to suggest that any time the defendant advances a
Sixth Amendment claim, the competing governmental interest must be "strictly scruti-
nized" by the appellate court, resulting in a reversal of the defendant's conviction, un-
less the prosecution can establish a "compelling government interest" sufficient to
outweigh the defendant's claim. Jonakait, supra note 1, at 729.
16 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
17 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
18 Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1904. "[T]he possibility of racial prejudice against a black
defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice .. " Id.
1992] 529
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proper procedures for determining juror impartiality. They argued
that individual questioning about the content of pretrial publicity
should have been undertaken by the trial judge.' 9 But the dissent-
ers never claimed that the majority was using due process analysis as
a means of sweeping biased jury claims under the "fair trial" rug.
Rather, as the dissent conceded, this case was one of first impres-
sion, in which the Court was called upon to decide "the procedures
necessary to assure the protection of the right to an impartial jury
under the Sixth Amendment" 20 : to decide, in short, what process
was due the defendant. By definition, a "due process" analysis is
appropriate for such an inquiry. It is Professor Jonakait, not the
Court, who ignores the specific language of the Sixth Amendment
when he concludes that it guarantees, not only an impartial jury, but
also certain procedures to determine the impartiality of a jury.
As Mu'Min suggests, the modem Sixth Amendment stands for
two different types of rights. The first type might be termed "abso-
lute rights," referring to rights are required by the text of the Sixth
Amendment. Among these rights are the right to counsel,2' a jury
trial 22 and an impartial jury.23 Once a court finds an abridgement of
these "absolute" rights, it must reverse the conviction. The fairness
of a trial cannot serve as a mitigating factor if an "absolute" Sixth
Amendment right has been denied the defendant. 24
The second category of rights may be deemed "derivative" or
"relative" rights. In addition to finding that the Sixth Amendment
places certain absolute requirements on the criminal trial, the Court
has determined that defendants are entitled to certain derivative
rights, which are aimed at ensuring that the "absolute" or literal
Sixth Amendment rights are rendered truly meaningful. Thus, for
example, a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, a
relative right, as well as to the absolute right to have a lawyer appear
on his behalf.25 MuMin applies this logic to the "absolute" right to
an impartial jury. Though the defendant claimed that pretrial pub-
licity deprived him of an impartial jury, the Court (both majority and
19 Id. at 1909-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, in a separate dissent,
agreed that the jurors should have been questioned individually, but he would not have
prescribed any particular form for that questioning. Id. at 1917-19.
20 Id. at 1912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23 Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
24 For example, in Parker, the Court held that "[a]side from [any showing of preju-
dice] . . . , we believe that the unauthorized conduct of the bailiff involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed [presumptively prejudicial] .... "
Id. at 365 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)). See also supra note 14.
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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dissent) did not consider the case in that light. Rather, the Court
focused on what procedures the defendant is entitled to in order to
insure that his absolute right to an impartial jury has not been vio-
lated.26 Such a procedural issue has rightly been considered by the
Court to be a matter for due process analysis. 27
Some of the textual Sixth Amendment rights are themselves
relative in nature. Barker v. Wingo 28 illustrates the Court's different
approach in the context of the relative textual right to a speedy trial.
Unlike the right to counsel or to a jury trial, the right to a "speedy
trial," while required by the Sixth Amendment, is never self-defin-
ing.29 It is by nature a relative right.30 Still, if a defendant is denied
what the Court considers a "speedy trial," his conviction must be
reversed.3' Barker reaffirmed the speedy trial right as "fundamen-
tal."'3 2 The real issue, however, is what sorts of delays will be
deemed violative of the "speedy trial" guarantee. Thus, in Barker,
the Court "set out the criteria by which the speedy trial right is to be
judged. 33 A unanimous Court used a due process balancing ap-
proach, requiring that lower courts consider the "[l]ength of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant" in determining whether a speedy trial
violation has occurred.3 4 In short, the defendant is entitled to a fair
weighing of the factors in determining whether his speedy trial right
26 Mu'Min v. Virginia, I11 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991).
27 Id. (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975)). See also Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (whether forbidding the defendant to speak to his counsel
overnight violates the right to counsel); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
(whether a 10-2 verdict violates the right to ajury trial). Other Sixth Amendment rights
may also raise similarly difficult questions that will require a balancing of competing
interests.
28 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
29 "[T]he right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights
enshrined in the Constitution .... [It] is a vague concept ... We cannot definitely say
how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate."
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-21 (1972).
30 While we may be able to look at a trial and find that the right to counsel or jury
trial was clearly denied, the question of whether a delay rendered a trial insufficiently
"speedy" is always going to require additional inquiry into the reasons for the delay.
In another context, the Court has recognized that "one must make a distinction
between, on the one hand, trial rights that derive from the violation of constitutional
guarantees and, on the other hand, the nature of those constitutional guarantees them-
selves. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2798 (1990). Oddly, in Rodriguez, a con-
sent search case, the Court distinguished between an absolute derivative right (that
waivers of trial rights must be "knowing" and "intelligent") and the relative, constitu-
tionally declared, right against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Id. at 2798-99.
31 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
32 Barker, 407 U.S. at 515.
33 Id. at 515.
34 Id. at 530.
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has been abridged. Thus, recent cases do not represent a retreat
from the principle that Sixth Amendment rights are "fundamental."
Instead, this principle is assumed. The Supreme Court currently
addresses questions concerning how these fundamental rights must
be effectuated, and how their violation will be determined.
The Court's treatment of the right to compulsory process in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,3 5 which ProfessorJonakait cites as another ex-
ample of the Sixth Amendment's erosion, further demonstrates how
the modern jurisprudence works. The right to compulsory process
is, like the right to a speedy trial, absolute in form but relative in
practice. No one, including ProfessorJonakait, seriously claims that
a defendant is entitled to subpoena every record or call every wit-
ness he wants, regardless of how irrelevant, prejudicial or confiden-
tial the evidence in question may be. Rather, the right to
compulsory process necessarily is one in which the defendant's in-
terest in the evidence is balanced against the various reasons that
may be offered for denying it to him.
In Ritchie, a defendant charged with sexually abusing his daugh-
ter sought to discover the confidential records of the state agency
that had initially investigated the charges. Instead of coming to
grips with the relative nature of the right, as it had with the speedy
trial right in Barker, the Ritchie Court held that "compulsory process
provides no greater protections than the due process clause,"3 6 and
then held that the defendant had a limited right of access to the
records but that due process would be satisfied by in camera inspec-
tion of the records (for inconsistencies with the victim's trial testi-
mony) rather than by turning them over to the defense.
In Ritchie, the Court again assumed that once it had been deter-
mined that the defendant's right to compulsory process has been
violated, his conviction must be reversed.3 7 The issues in the case,
however, were whether the "Compulsory Process Clause guarantees
the right to discover the identity of the witnesses or to require the
35 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (cited in Jonakait, supra note 1, at 722).
36 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.
37 Thus, in Ritchie, the Court notes that, "[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that
criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the at-
tendance offavorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before the jury evidence that
might influence the determination of guilt." Id. at 56 (emphasis added). The Court
cited with approval cases such as Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972), and Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), in which convictions were reversed for violation of the com-
pulsory process right (called a "due process" violation in Webb), without regard to any
consideration of whether the trial was otherwise fair. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at n.13.
532 [Vol. 83
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government to produce exculpatory evidence." 3s These issues, the
Court concluded, and the dissent did not disagree, were matters for
due process analysis.
ProfessorJonakait points to the comment that compulsory pro-
cess provides no greater protection than due process as further es-
tablishing the conflation of due process and Sixth Amendment
rights.a9 But this misses the point. Since the compulsory process
right is a relative one, the issue in each case is necessarily going to
be whether the particular evidence that the defendant sought was
"material" to his case, as the Court held.40 Thus, ProfessorJonakait
is correct that the Court employed a due process approach, but in-
correct in asserting that this represents a departure from the way
such cases have been, and, by their nature must be, decided. Again,
nothing in Ritchie suggests that, had a defendant been denied mate-
rial evidence necessary to prove his case, reversal of his conviction
would depend upon the overall fairness of the trial. The question of
whether the concept of "compulsory process" included discovering
the identity of potential exculpatory witnesses and the propriety of
the procedures adopted by the trial judge in this case, naturally lend
themselves to a "fundamental fairness" analysis.
The other major case offered by Professor Jonakait to support
his thesis is Strickland v. Washington41 which, he argues "[p]rovides a
prime example of the Court's standards depriving the Sixth Amend-
ment of separate meaning." 42 But Strickland also does not do what
Jonakait claims.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the "right to
... Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 43 Nowhere in Strickland,
or in its companion cases, United States v. Cronic,44 did the Court sug-
gest that a defendant who is denied legal representation will never-
theless have his conviction affirmed if his trial was "fundamentally
fair." This approach, previously adopted in Betts v. Brady,45 has
since been overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright.46 Contrary to Profes-
38 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. The Court noted that the Clause may require the produc-
tion of [exculpatory] evidence. Id.
39 Id.
40 In fact, while ProfessorJonakait decries the decision in Ritchie, the Court's finding
that the state had a "compelling interest" in the confidentiality of the records, 480 U.S.
at 60, is just the sort of "strict scrutiny" analysis that ProfessorJonakait urges. Jonakait,
supra note 1, at 729.
41 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42 Jonakait, supra note 1, at 716.
43 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
44 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
45 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
46 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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sor Jonakait's claim, 47 neither Strickland, Cronic nor any other case
reinstates the Betts standard.
In Strickland48 and Cronic,49 the Court extended Gideon by hold-
ing that the Sixth Amendment required not merely the participation
of counsel for the defendant, but also the derivative right to coun-
sel's effective assistance. These cases enunciate the standards used in
determining whether effective assistance was rendered. And, as
with the other derivative rights, an inquiry into counsel's "effective-
ness" requires a due process balancing approach-i.e., what level of
"effectiveness is the defendant due.
Strickland holds that in cases of "actual or constructive denial of
counsel," prejudice is assumed.50 Thus, a defendant who is actually
or constructively denied assistance of counsel will have his convic-
tion reversed, regardless of any attempt by the state to show that the
trial was fair.5 1 Contrary to Professor Jonakait's claim, the Court
still gives effect to the literal command of the Sixth Amendment.
Strickland goes on to hold that, if there is a conflict-free and un-
impeded counsel, then the defendant must show "there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different" in order to suc-
ceed in a claim that counsel was constitutionally "ineffective." 52 In
holding this, the Court was not interpreting the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel; it was interpreting the derivative right created by
the Court itself to effective assistance. As to these standards, neither
the Court, nor concurring Justice Brennan, made any mention of a
return to pre-Gideon standards. Justice Brennan opined:
[T]hese standards are sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinc-
tions between those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of
their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time, the
standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the wide variety of
47 "Mu Min applied the same standard as had the Betts Court." Jonakait, supra note 1,
at 716. Under Jonakait's interpretation of Strickland, "[tihe specific right of the Sixth
[Amendment], then, gives an accused nothing not already granted in the general provi-
sion of due process." Id. at 717.
48 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
49 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
50 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In cases of conflict of interest, prejudice will also be
presumed "if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting
interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's perform-
ance.'" Id. (citation omitted).
51 The Strickland Court went on to say that a conflict of interest that "adversely af-
fected (defense counsel's] performance" would also lead to reversal, regardless of the
fairness of the trial. Id.
52 Id. at 694.
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situations giving rise to claims of this kind.5 3
Only Justice Marshall dissented from this opinion, but unlike
Professor Jonakait, he, too, agreed that Strickland was an exercise in
"develop[ing] standards for distinguishing effective from inade-
quate assistance [of counsel]," rather than a reinstatement of the
Betts v. Brady due process analysis. 54
Justice Marshall did argue that, under the majority's holding,
"the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty de-
fendant is convicted after trial in which he was represented by a
manifestly ineffective attorney." 55 While this statement is true, it is
only a criticism of the particular approach adopted by the majority,
namely the "result of the trial would have been different" prong,
not a claim that the effect of the majority's ruling would be a return
to Betts. 56
It would, indeed, be inconsistent with "incorporation" for the
Court to modify de facto, the terms of the Sixth Amendment by
adopting procedures that would make it impossible for a defendant
to win a Sixth Amendment claim unless he could show that his trial
was unfair. Professor Jonakait accuses the Court of adopting such
procedures, but he cites no examples. On the contrary, the Court
continues to enforce absolutely the positive commands of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, all defendants57 are entitled to counsel, jury
53 Id. at 703. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Professors
Saltzburg and Capra characterize Strickland similarly to Justice Brennan:
At last the Supreme Court has set forth a test for assessing adequacy of counsel. It
appears that the Court adopted a middle ground between presuming that lawyer
errors require reversal of convictions (absent some overwhelming showing of harm-
lessness), which would have called into question many convictions and placed a
heavy burden on the government to support convictions tainted in any way by law-
yer mistakes, and requiring defendants to show with some degree of certainty that
they would have received a more favorable judgment but for the mistakes of coun-
sel, which would have resulted in defendant's bearing an exceptionally difficult
burden.
STEPHEN SALTZBURG & DANIEL CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1040 (4th ed.
1992). For adverse comment on Strickland, see VIVIAN BERCER, The Supreme Court and De-
fense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986).
Two years after Strickland, the Court showed that the case had teeth when it re-
versed a conviction for the failure of defense counsel to file a motion to suppress evi-
dence because of his misapprehension of the law of discovery of inculpatory materials.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
54 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined the
opinion but dissented from the judgment because of his views on the death penalty. Id.
at 701.
55 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 710-11.
57 There are certain exceptions for minor cases not criticized by Professor Jonakait.
See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (counsel only required if defendant may be
1992] 535
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trial, impartial juries, speedy trial, 58 confrontation of witnesses, 5 9
among other rights. Indeed, the Court has even included an
unenumerated right of defendants to testify within the Sixth
Amendment, and reversed a conviction for its violation.60 In no
case has the Court conceded that one of these rights has been vio-
lated and still upheld the conviction on the ground that overall, the
defendant received a fair trial.6 1
WhatJonakait perceives as a retreat to due process standards is
actually the Court taking the absolute constitutional guarantees for
granted. The cases that come before the Court today present issues
involving derivative rights-to effective assistance of counsel, to com-
pel production of particular arguably inadmissible or irrelevant evi-
dence, to ferret out possible bias by asking potential jurors certain
questions on voir dire, among other rights. Such assertions of deriv-
ative rights necessarily require that the Court engage in a due pro-
cess balancing approach, while it stands ready to reverse
automatically any conviction in which textual guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment have been violated. One could well argue that in cases
addressing these derivative rights, the Court has struck the balance
too far in favor of the government. Perhaps this is Professor
Jonakait's real gripe. But to argue that these cases have "deprive[d]
imprisoned); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (jury trial not required for of-
fenses in which less than six months imprisonment is authorized).
58 ProfessorJonakait concedes that "[tihe Court has not employed what is essentially
a due process test for the speedy trial right because the Court has recognized that this
Sixth Amendment guarantee serves important goals other than impairment of the de-
fense." Jonakait, supra note 1, at 723 n.40 (citing United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1
(1982)).
59 In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court held that it was not necessary to
decide whether having witnesses testify behind a screen violated the defendant's due
process right to a fair trial, since it did violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront his
accuser. See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), in which the Court held that
the right of confrontation was not violated by allowing victims in a child molestation
case to testify and be cross-examined in a room separate from the defendant, with the
testimony transmitted to the courtroom via closed-circuit television. One could argue,
as did Justice Scalia in his dissent, that the Court "failed ... conspicuously to sustain a
categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion."
Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But once again, this decision is based, not on a conclu-
sion by the Court that an otherwise fair trial will overcome Confrontation Clause viola-
tions, but that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the procedures in question.
60 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
61 See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (no showing of prejudice is required
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed if appellate counsel has with-
drawn without filing a statement of reasons why he believed the defendant's claims on
appeal were frivolous); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (reversing a conviction
based on a 5-1 jury vote as violative of the jury trial without considering whether the trial
was "fair").
REPLY TO PROFESSOR JONAKAIT
Sixth Amendment guarantees of any independent meaning and
made them superfluous"6 2 is simply wrong.63
62 Jonakait, supra note 1, at 713.
63 For example, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941), the petitioner, a farmhand of
"little education" and no money, was tried for robbery without a lawyer, convicted and
sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Certainly, today's Court would reverse this con-
viction, regardless of whether the trial seemed otherwise "fair."
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